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CHINA'S CLAIMS 

at the 

PEACE TABLE 



CHINA'S CLAIMS 

at the 

PEACE TABLE 



Published by 

CHINESE PATRIOTIC COMMITTEE 

New York City 

March. 1Q19 



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A!JQ 2 5 1919 



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CONTENTS 

PAGE 

A. China and the League of Nations 5 

B. China's Peace Claims n 

I. The Unconditional Return of Kiao- 

Chou ii 

II. The Nullification of Chino-Japanese 
Treaties of 191 5 and Secret Agree- 
ments of 1918 18 

III. The Cancellation of Boxer Indemnity. 27 

IV. The Restoration of Tariff Autonomy 31 
V. The Relinquishment of Extra-Terri- 
torial Jurisdiction 36 

VI. The Retrocession of Leased Terri- 
tories 44 

VII. The Abolition of Financial Imperialism 48 

Summary 59 



CHINA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 

Among all the powers of the world, great and small, 
now gathering at the Paris Conference, China en- 
dorses the plan of the League of Nations most unhesi- 
tatingly and wholeheartedly. Immediately after the 
announcement of the proposed League Constitution, 
China, throughout the length and breadth of the Re- 
public, entertains but one sentiment, that, hereafter a 
new order of nationalism and internationalism based 
on right and justice is to reign in the world, and by 
this new order, China hopes to get an honorable place 
among the family of nations, which she is legally and 
morally entitled to, and by which she will be able not 
only to realize her material development without moles- 
tation from outside, but also to render greater and bet- 
ter services to mankind at large. This universal senti- 
ment of China has been voiced by both her government 
and people. From Peking and from elsewhere, cables 
of congratulation have been forwarded to President 
Wilson, the founder of the League, with messages of 
appreciation and pledges of support for the newly 
organized international federation. Dr. V. K. Well- 
ington Koo, one of China's delegates at Paris, and one 
of the members on the committee of the drafting of 
the League Constitution, has repeatedly declared 
China's strong and firm stand for the League, in the 
council meetings as well as in the plenary sessions. 
Why does China have such an undivided and over- 
whelming enthusiasm and faith in the League ? 

China endorses the League of Nations, because she 
agrees with the ideals and principles involved, in her 
heart, not merely in words. She believes in interna- 



tional amity and good will in the strictest sense of the 
term. She aspires to nothing but peace and friendship 
with other powers. Militarism and imperialism China 
dislikes most, for they are alien and unknown to the 
democratic mind of the Chinese people. The ethical 
code for international relations that China has learned 
from her long-continuous history and age-honored 
civilization is one of mutual respect and unselfish 
cooperation among the parties concerned. Friendly 
relations should always be maintained one nation with 
another; and international disputes or quarrels if any, 
should always be settled through amicable means. Small 
and weak nations should be left unfettered and un- 
molested; and a common enemy menacing the world 
peace should be crushed by all members of the society 
of nations, through diplomatic channels, if possible, and 
through armed demonstration if necessary. Interna- 
tional rivalries and intrigues, as such, have never been 
taught by China's old teachers; and war is always 
against the moral conception of Chinese philosophy. 
In these ideals and principles China, as a nation, be- 
lieves f rom time immemorial ; and in these ideals and 
principles the League of Nations promises a permanent 
peace of the world for the ages to come. This coinci- 
dence of fundamentals makes China's membership in 
the League one of instinctive affiliation rather than 
one of artificial inclination. 

China, as a member of the League, has a supreme 
duty to perform, a duty of helping the realization of 
ideals and principles, for which both she herself and 
the League stand. First and foremost, China chooses 
to appeal to the liberal world for a complete readjust- 
ment of the Far Eastern status. In appealing for this 

6 



readjustment, China is working for the interests of the 
world peace, not for the interest of herself alone, be- 
cause the Far Eastern problem, if not solved now once 
and for all, would cause another world catastrophe as 
disastrous as the one just ended. Ever since the con- 
tact of the Orient with the Occident, the Far East has 
been a field of intrigues and rivalries among the Euro- 
pean and the Europeanized states ; and China has been 
the target of all the evil forces of the bye-gone genera- 
tion. Non-militaristic and peace-loving as China is, she 
has been mercilessly treated as an inexhausti- 
ble prey of "Secret Treaties," "Spheres of Influence," 
and "Balance of Powers." The history of the Far 
Eastern diplomacy played by different powers con- 
tains dark records shameful both to humanity and 
civilization, incompatible either with Kultur, or with 
culture, or with Bushido. Not for one day during 
the last few decades, China has ceased to be the victim 
of the ever condemnable aspiration known as imperial- 
ism, be it political, economic, religious, or otherwise, 
aspired to by one nation or another, particularly by her 
Germanized neighbor in late years. The Far East has 
thus become a centre of complicated troubles. In 
China there are still growing conflicts of interests and 
policies of different nations ; these conflicts alone, re- 
gardless of the natural opposition on the part of the 
Chinese, would be enough to lead into another world- 
wide bloody struggle. This, however, the Peace 
delegates at Paris are seeking to avoid, and the spirit 
of the League does not allow. 

That China has ample justification in her claim of 
readjusting her relations with foreign powers, no one 
will deny. But will the European and the European 



states consent to such a readjustment unconditionally? 
Surely they will, if not for the sake of China, then 
for the sake of the newly founded League. The 
League of Nations will be absurd and meaningless 
if it will tolerate further continuance of old immoral 
as well as impolitic policies practiced by the powers in 
the Orient. With the birth of the League, a new era 
has been inaugurated. The age of imperialism, im- 
perialism of any description, is gone forever. China 
is just as tired of her humiliations as the world is 
tired of wars. The world democracy cries for the 
elimination of future wars; and the new regime of 
liberalism calls for an immediate renunciation of 
China's humiliations. All the wrongs that China has 
suffered from other powers during the last century, 
and for which she herself has never been responsible, 
must be one and all righted. Before the League of 
Nations can be secure and before China can become 
an effective and efficient member of the League her 
complete sovereignty and independence must be re- 
stored. Before the world is safe for democracy, the 
Pacific must be preserved pacific. In this appeal 
China is aiming, neither at revenge nor at her own 
nationalistic interest, but at the perfection of the 
League ideals and principles in deeds as well as in 
letter. She is sure that the other members of the 
League will share her aim, which is common to all 
and antagonistic to none. 

China is a nation with an enormous population and 
unlimited resources, backed up by a splendid history 
and advanced civilization. She has never upheld the 
selfish ambition of taking alone, but not giving. As 
one of the members ~of the League, she is willing to 

8 



serve the world any way possible, either toward ma- 
terial progress or toward spiritual advancement. 
Materially her inexhaustible resources and labor will 
increase the comfort and luxury of every nation; and 
spiritually, her ancient history and civilization will 
contribute intellectual delightfulness and ethical 
wholesomeness to mankind. She has been expect- 
ing to render these services to her sister nations in 
return for her debt to the modern scientific learning 
of the West, but she has never been given a chance, 
for every step she moves she is hampered by treaties 
or concessions with one polwer or another. Unless 
China is left free to manage her own affairs, the ideal 
civilization for the new era as sought by the League 
of Nations will remain only as a dream. If the 
League of Nations is to mean future happiness for 
mankind, China's international standing must be re- 
vised, so that she can play her important role of the 
League programme well. 

Unfortunately or fortunately, China's case should 
assume such an importance and magnitude at Paris 
Conference. Her claims at the Peace Table as out- 
lined in the following pages should not be overlooked. 
They are in fact the crucial tests of the ideals and 
principles of the League of Nations. The success or 
failure of the League depends upon the solution of 
the Far Eastern question. If the spirit of the League 
is to be applicable to China, then the prospect of the 
new regime is bright and safe. If China, after such 
a display of enthusiasm and faith over the League 
plan, is to be disappointed by the verdict of the Con- 
ference, then the future of the League will be 
very much in doubt. The problem of the Far East is 



indeed momentous. Four hundred millions of peo- 
ple are facing a life and death sentence at Paris ; and 
upon this sentence the fate of the permanent peace of 
the world is going to depend. China pleads for noth- 
ing but fair play and sound judgment. For the interest 
of the world peace and for the interest of four hun- 
dred millions of people a death sentence should not be 
tolerated by the enlightened' powers, particularly the 
United States of America, in whom China has deepest 
confidence and by whom the upright plan of the 
League of Nations is originated. 



10 



. CHINA'S PEACE CLAIMS 

I. The Unconditional Return of Kiao-Chou 

Kiao-Chou, including the commercial port of Tsing- 
tao, is an integral part of Chinese territory. It is 
situated on the southern coast of Shantung Province. 
The Bay of Kiao-Chou, together with the port of 
Tsingtao, forms one of the finest commercial centres of 
the world. Kiao-Chou, owing to its promontories 
overlooking the Gulf of Chih-Li, has great military 
and naval value, both for offensive and defensive pur- 
poses; and from Tsing-tao, the Kiao-Chou-Tsinan 
Railroad controls the mainland of Shantung, leading to 
Chih-Li Province in which is located the capital of 
China, Peking. 

Since 1898, Kiao-Chou has been leased to the for- 
mer German Government for 99 years, because of a 
trivial murder of two Catholic missionaries by native 
Chinese. Following this precedent, one nation after 
another came to China for territory ; the lease of Kiao- 
Chou thus marked the beginning of dark history of Far 
Eastern diplomacy. When the war broke out in Europe 
in 1914, China, seeing the opportunity to destroy the 
miniature of German Kultur in the Orient, established 
in Kiao-Chou, offered to declare war on Germany ; but 
this offer was refused by Japan, and by Japan alone, 
obviously for her selfish motives. Instead, the Island 
Empire demanded Germany to withdraw her occupa- 
tion from Kiao-Chou; and upon failure of the latter's 
answer, she, with the help of British military and 
naval forces, crossed neutral territory of China and 
captured her objective, Kiao-Chou, including Tsing- 
tao, on November 7, 1914. Since the capture, Japan 

11 



has been Japanizing the territory all the time. She 
collected the customs duty from the port, which for 
the four years has run up to tens of millions of dollars. 
She replaced German administration, with methods 
and systems peculiarly Japanese. She maintained a 
large army and a strong fleet in Kiao-Chou, which was 
called for by no occasion. She has sent to' the terri- 
tory thousands of Japanese subjects, representing all 
kinds of petty professions, including prostitution. 
Worse than that, she has even established civil ad- 
ministration and military stations along the Kiao- 
Chou-Tsinan Railroad, outside the territory of Kiao- 
Chou, which the Germans never dared to do. In spite 
of numerous protests from Chinese Government and 
people, Japan showed little willingness to modify her 
policy until very recently. 

On the day when Japan sent her ultimatum to Ger- 
many in August, 1 9 14, Count Okuma, then the Japa- 
nese Premier, telegraphed to the press in America, 
saying: "Japan's proximity to China breeds many 
absurd rumors, but I declare that Japan acts with a 
clear conscience in conformity with justice, and in 
perfect accord with her ally. Japan has no territorial 
ambitions and hopes to stand as the protector of the 
peace in the Orient." On another occasion he reiter- 
ated his statement as follows : "As Premier of Japan, 
I have stated and I now again state to the people of 
America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior 
motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought 
of depriving China or other people of anything that 
they now possess. My Government and my people 
have given their pledge which will be as honorably 
kept as Japan always keeps promises." Public state- 



12 



merits to the similar effect have been once and again 
issued by Japanese governmental officials. Even as 
late as January 21, 1919, Viscount Uchida, the Japa- 
nese Foreign Minister, told the world through his 
speech in Japanese Parliament, "It goes without say- 
ing that Japan has no territorial ambition in China or 
elsewhere, neither does she contemplate any action 
which might militate against that development of the 
legitimate intent and welfare of the Chinese nation. 
We have solemnly pledged ourselves to respect the 
territorial integrity of China and to abide faithfully 
by the principle of equal opportunity and the open 
door for commerce and industry." But all these state- 
ments became meaningless, when Premier Hara 
answered the interpellation in the Japanese Diet on 
February 21, 19 19, that he did not see any reason for 
China to claim the restoration of Tsing-tao. 

While the Japanese Premier and other Japanese 
expansionists fail to see the ground of China's claim, 
we Chinese fail to see the reasoning of Japanese logic 
tinged with Teutonic philosophy. The only argu- 
ment that the Japanese may base their contentions 
that they have the right to keep Kiao-Chou and Tsing- 
tao as their own is deducted from the following treaty 
and note between China and Japan. 

a. Treaty of May 25, 191 5, respecting the Prov- 
ince of Shantung: Article I. The Chinese Gov- 
ernment agrees to give full assent to all matters 
upon which the Japanese Government may here- 
after agree with the German Government relating 
to the disposition of all rights, interests, and con- 
cessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or 

13 



otherwise, possess in relation to the Province 
of Shantung. 

b. Exchange of Notes on May 25, 1915, respect- 
ing the restoration of the leased territory of Kiao- 
Chou Bay: When, after the termination of the 
present war, the Leased Territory of Kiao-Chou 
is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, 
the Japanese Government will restore the said 
leased territory to China under the following con- 
ditions : 

1. The whole of Kiao-Chou Bay to be opened as 
a commercial port. 

2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction 
of Japan to be established at a place designated 
by the Japanese Government. 

3. If the powers desire it, an international con- 
cession may be established. 

4. As regard the disposal to be made of the build- 
ings and properties of Germany and ithe condi- 
tions and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese 
Government and the Chinese Government shall 
arrange the matter by mutual agreement before 
the restoration. 

This treaty and note were signed and exchanged 
under pressure of force. Plainly speaking, they 
amount to the old philosophy — might is right. By 
this philosophy Japan maintains that by virtue of her 
conquest over the Germans she subsequently succeeds 
the enjoyment of all German rights and privileges in 
Kiao-Chou conceded by China to the former German 

14 



Government through treaty or otherwise. She fur- 
ther maintains that if Kiao-Chou is to be returned to 
China, the above quoted four specified conditions must 
be fulfilled by China. 

Against these contentions China maintains the fol- 
lowing : 

A. Legally Japan has no justification to keep Kiao- 
Chou. China's declaration of war on Teutonic 
Powers in August, 1917, abrogated all treaties and 
agreements existing between China and the former 
German Government, and automatically terminated 
at the same time the Chino-Japanese Treaty of May 
25, 191 5, respecting the Province of Shantung. Upon 
this abrogation and termination of treaties and agree- 
ments, including the lease of Kiao-Chou, China is the 
only one who has the right to claim back all interests 
and privileges conceded to the former German Gov- 
ernment. The mere fact that Japan captured Kiao- 
Chou from the Germans does not give Japan any right 
of succession over the interests and privileges en- 
joyed by the Germans since 1898, because China 
signed the lease with Germany alone, and with nobody 
else. Japan's occupation in Kiao-Chou has no other 
legal status than a military occupation ; and as such she 
has no right to retain the said territory, when the mili- 
tary necessity ceases. As "a sincere friend of China," 
as "a protector of the peace in the Far East," and as 
"an upholder of international law," as Japan is used to 
style herself, she should have handed over to China 
unconditionally all her occupation in Shantung, par- 
ticularly in Kiao-Chou, before China claims for the 
same. For compensation of the campaign of Tsing- 
tao, if any and if justifiable, Japan should ask for that 

15 



from the Germans. China has nothing to do with the 
campaign, and thus she sustains no obligation to Japan 
whatsoever. Japan therefore has no legal justification 
in retaining Kiao-Chou and Tsing-tao, and China's 
claim for the restoration of the same is therefore in 
accordance with the international law. 

B. Morally Japan has no right to keep Kiao-Chou. 
One of the established principles of international law 
regarding the termination of treaties and agreements 
is that when a treaty or agreement is concluded upon 
threat of force, that treaty or agreement is voidable. 
The note between China and Japan of May 25, 1915, 
was exchanged after the same threat that made China 
yield to Japan's Twenty-One Demands. China con- 
sented the conditions for the restoration of Kiao-Chou 
as Japan specified them in the above quoted note, only 
because of the pressure of that threat. If these speci- 
fied conditions are to be carried out, the restoration of 
Kiao-Chou would not mean anything in actual fact. 
This is particularly true in the case of the second 
condition, which says, "a concession under the exclu- 
sive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place 
designated by the Japanese Government." What does 
this mean? The "place" Japan has in mind is the 
port of Tsingtao, the best of all naval bases on Chinese 
coast. In other words, under this condition, Japan 
,would try to deceive the world as well as to deceive 
China, by restoring Kiao-Chou, but keeping the best 
part of the territory for herself, namely, Tsing-tao. 
The fulfilment of this condition, China will never con- 
sent, and the world should never permit, for Japanese 
occupation of Tsing-tao will not only impare China's 
territorial integrity, but also shut off equal opportunity 

16 



of commerce and industry that other nations have 
the right to share in the Province of Shantung. Thus 
the restoration of Kiao-Chou would 1 not be complete 
until every part of the territory of Kiao-Chou, Tsing- 
tao not excepted, is turned over to China. The master 
stroke of deceipt of Japan exemplified in the specified 
conditions should be condemned, and Japan must be 
made to live up to her own words, "Japan has no terri- 
torial ambition in China or elsewhere." In the spirit 
of the ideals and principles that the League of Nations 
stands for, we Chinese therefore claim that the note 
exchanged on May 25, 191 5, should be made null and 
void, and the entire territory of Kiao-Chou should 
be restored to China without any conditions attached 
whatsoever. 

Incidental to the claim for the restoration of Kiao- 
Chou, we further appeal to the enlightened Powers 
sitting at Paris for fair judgment on the problems set 
forth below. In carrying out the campaign of Tsing- 
tao, Japan violated the neutrality of China. She was 
attacking her enemy in a third neutral country. The 
international law has never allowed such a violation 
of neutrality. No provision in the law will justify 
Japan's action, and Japan must be duly punished for 
this violation. The campaign of Tsing-tao lasted for 
about three months, during which China suffered 
losses of life and property in the territory where the 
battle was fought. Justice should provide compen- 
sation for China. Since the German withdrawal from 
Kiao-Chou, Japan has exacted from the customs duty 
an amount far exceeding the actual expenses of the 
campaign. If the international law is to be upheld, 

17 



China is^ entitled for a favorable adjustment of this 
customs receipt with Japan. 

China therefore has ample justification, both le- 
gally and morally, to claim for the restoration of 
Kiao-Chou, and for the adjustment of the incidental 
problems. To this justifiable claim of China, the 
Peace Conference should not deny. If Japan is to 
get what she wants, then the war would be fought in 
vain, and the League of Nations would be nothing but 
words. 

II. The Nullification of the Chino^ Japanese 

Treaties of 191 5 and the Secret 

Agreements of 19 18 

a. The Treaties of 191 5. 

We demand the nullification of the Chino-Japanese 
treaties of 191 5 on three grounds. First, because 
they were made under duress and threat. Second, 
because they impair China's independence. Third, 
because they are a menace to the future peace of the 
world. 

As to the first, little need be said than stating 
briefly how these treaties came about. As the world 
knows, the Chino-Japanese treaties of 19 15 are re- 
sults of the notorious Twenty-One Demands presented 
to China by Japan on January 18, 191 5, for the pur- 
pose, as the opening sentence of the Japanese demands 
declared, "of maintaining the general peace in 
Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friend- 
ly relations and good neighborhood existing between 
the two nations/' Of course we need not wonder 
whether the general peace in Eastern Asia was in any 

18 



way endangered or whether the friendly relations be- 
tween the two nations needed such an extra strength- 
ening. In plain words, Japan simply coveted the 
things embodied in her 21 demands. The European 
powers were breathlessly engaged in fighting German 
militarism; America also focussed her attention on 
the battlefield of the Western Hemisphere. Every- 
body was busy save Japan. It was a God-sent chance 
for Great Nippon. The "ten thousand years" had 
come and must not let pass. Accordingly, Japan pre- 
sented her 21 demands to China. She presented them 
with a warning that the matter must be kept secret 
and that if it should be known to the world China 
must suffer the consequences for it. China, bullied 
and helpless, obeyed the order of her neighbor, who 
sought to strengthen "the friendly relations" with her. 
Therefore the matter was not known to the outside 
world until many weeks after, when finally the news 
through some way leaked out. Then the nation was 
alarmed and the world bewildered. But Japan stood 
firm and pressed her demands ever resolutely. The 
Chinese government, seeing it impossible bo escape 
the designed blow, agreed to 15 of the 21 demands, 
pleading that the other 6 being of a nature violating 
her sovereign rights she "felt difficult to accept." In 
order to show her determination, Japan changed on 
April 26 the original 21 demands into 24. China was 
sltill unyielding and the negotiations lasted another 
three weeks. Then, on May 7, under a clear sky, the 
Japanese Minister at Peking handed to the Chinese 
President an ultimatum, which stated that with the 
exception of Group V Japan expected China to ac- 

19 



cept unconditionally all the demands within 48 hours. 
The last sentences of the ultimatum read : 

"The Imperial Government hereby offer their 
advice and hope thaJt the Chinese Govern- 
ment, upon this advice, will give satisfactory 
reply by 6 o'clock p.m. on the 9th day of 
May. It is hereby declared that if no satis- 
factory reply is received before or at the 
specified time the Imperial Government will 
take such steps as they may deem necessary ." 

Meanwhile, the Japanese warships had already been 
dispatched to Chinese waters and Japanese troops 
were under orders for action. Japan (thus decided 
to teach China her national religion that might is 
right. China, being a peaceful nation and in no con- 
dition to test the prowess of the Sunrise Kingdom, 
bowed, as the events proved, to the inevitable and 
yielded unconditionally to the Asiatic Prussia. Then 
followed the exchanges of notes making the interpre- 
tation of the terms still unbearable to a nation already 
humiliated; the treaties were concluded on May 25, 
191 5- 

This is the origin of the Chino- Japanese treaties of 
191 5. They were forced upon China. They have 
no validity in a time when we say "might does not 
make right." The treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Buda- 
pest have been annulled because they were made 
under duress. Yet Russia and Rumania had been at 
war with Germany and the treaties were natural con- 
sequences of a lost war. But China was innocent and 
gave Japan no provocation. Compare the two sets of 
unprovoking to Japan. Compare the two sets of 

30 



treaties, one will be convinced that Germany, ruthless 
as she was, still showed more leniency toward Russia 
and Rumania than Japan toward China. Can there be 
any slightest reason that Nippon should not follow 
the example of Deutchland? 

In the second place, Japan should not be allowed 
to retain her booty of 19 15 because the treaties con- 
cluded seriously impair China's existence as an in- 
dependent nation. To be true to fact, let us examine 
some of the most important terms of the treaties. 

Article 1 of the Treaty respecting Shantung de- 
clares : "The Chinese Government agrees to give full 
assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Gov- 
ernment may hereafter agree with the German Gov- 
ernment relating to the disposition of all rights, in- 
terests, and concessions which Germany, by virtue of 
treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Prov- 
ince of Shantung." This eliminates China's sovereign 
rights from that province and makes it a pawn be- 
tween Japan and Germany. If Germany had no right 
in the home land of Confucius, then what right has 
Japan? Furthermore, the same treaty stipulates that 
when China wants to build a certain railroad in the 
Province of Shantung, she shall approach the Japanese 
capitalists first to negotiate for a loan. This is not 
different from saying that the railroad must he built by 
Japan. 

Article 1 of the Treaty repecting South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia declares that the 
terms of lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the 
terms of the South Manchurian Railway and the An- 
tung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to 99 years. 
The term "99 years 1 " is simply a pleasant substitute 

2J 



for perpetual ownership. Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the 
same treaty provide that Japanese subjects in South 
Manchuria shall have the right to reside, travel, and 
"engage in business and manufacture of any kind 
whatsoever" freely and that in civil and criminal cases 
in which the defendants are Japanese, they shall be 
tried and adjudicated, not by Chinese court, but by 
Japanese, consul. It can be easily inferred from these 
provisions that Japan can manufacture munitions and 
implements of war against China even within the very 
borders of China herself and yet with perfect im- 
munity. 

In the subsequent exchanges of notes, China is 
obliged to negotiate loans with Japanese capitalists 
first when she wants to build railways with foreign 
capital in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon- 
golia or when she wants to make loans on the security 
of the taxes in the above-mentioned places. Moreover, 
if foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial, 
military, or police matters are to be employed, Japanese 
have the right of preference. Inasmuch as China 
needs the assistance of foreign capital in building rail- 
ways and inasmuch as China often employs foreign 
advisers for purposes of internal reform, these pro- 
visions practically give Japan complete control over 
these provinces and reduce China's sovereignty to a 
mere fiction. 

What is more astonishing is the stipulation re- 
specting the Hanyehping Iron and Coal Company, 
China's largest iron works. The clause regarding this 
reads : 

"If in future the Hanyehping Company and 
the Japanese capitalists agree upon co-opera- 



2.2 



tion, the Chinese Government, in view of the 
intimate relations subsisting between the Jap- 
anese capitalists and' the said Company, will 
forthwith give its permission. The Chinese 
Government further agrees not to confiscate 
the said Company, nor without the consent of 
the Japanese capitalists to convert it into a 
state enterprise, nor cause iit to borrow and 
use foreign capital other than Japanese." 
The Hanyehping Company is China's only iron work 
worth mentioning and had been hitherto under the 
control of the Chinese. By this agreement, the con- 
trol, needless to say, has been transferred from Peking 
to Tokyo. 

So far we have just reviewed the circumstances 
under which these treaties were made and the nature 
of the treaties, which is absolutely incompatible with 
China's sovereign rights. Now let us turn to the third 
phase of the question, namely, the treaties as a menace 
to the future peace of the world. 

These treaties are a menace to the future peace of 
the world in two ways. First, the recognition of these 
treaties is a direct sanction of imperialism and will 
invite further conflicts among those nations which 
have interest in the Far East. Balance of power will 
again come into play. Spheres of influence will be 
resuscitated with additional vigor. The natural re- 
sult will be inevitably a clash of arms and the world 
will be set on fire again. Secondly, the Chinese 
people will not stand these iniquities. They 
have awakened to the new meaning of life; they 
want to manage their national affairs by them- 
selves, as they have done so for thousands of 

23 



years. An imposed master, from whatever source and 
for whatever purpose, not only will be refused but 
will soon meet his fate. We are tired of abject sub- 
mission and will tolerate no more wrongs. The es- 
tablishment of the Republic was the first sign of 
China's decision to become a modern power. The 
record of the last seven years is a strong proof of the 
nation's determination to march on the road of prog- 
ress with other nations and nothing can stand in its 
way. Yuan Shih-kai's imperial dream proved a fiasco 
and Chang Hsun's attempt to restore the boy emperor 
resulted in a farce. The Civil War of last year was a 
more vigorous manifestation of the nation's sense of 
justice and right. In short, the age of toleration of 
injustice has gone and the Chinese people know this. 
When the rest of the world is fighting for justice, China 
can not allow herself to be a criminal by tolerating 
injustice. Intrigue and design, as such, we will re- 
sist at any cost. 

From what has been said, it is obvious to every 
fair-minded person that for the promotion of justice, 
for China's national existence, and for the future peace 
of the world, the Chino- Japanese Treaties of 191 5 
should be condemned and nullified. We are sure the 
enlightened people of the world will echo our appeal 
with sympathy and support. 

b. The Secret Agreements of 1918 

There are about eighty secret agreements between 
China and Japan; many of them are known only 
to the men who negotiated them. But those we 
know may be divided into two classes. One is 

24 



the Agreements relating to the Chino Japanese Mili- 
tary Convention of May, 1918, and the other the three 
sets of notes exchanged on September 24, 1918. The 
latter have been recently published by the Chinese 
delegates to the Peace Conference, but the former 
still waits to be disclosed. When, a month ago it 
was first reported that the Chinese delegates to 
the Peace Conference would disclose the secret 
treaties imposed upon China by Japan, the Japanese 
Minister at Peking warned the Chinese Gov- 
ernment that should the Chinese delegates choose to 
do so, Japan would exert her financial pressure on 
China. The Minister from the Island Empire also 
informed the Chinese Government that "no help from 
outside could be expected because while Great Britain 
was engrossed in her internal disturbances, Japan had 
an unemployed army and navy." Despite the audacity 
of the Chinese delegates in revealing some of the secret 
agreements, obviously the threat of the "unemployed 
army and navy" served its purpose. 

Nevertheless, the Agreements of May, 1918, 
though unpublished, are not altogether unknown to 
the public. The Chinese newspapers some time ago 
gave out the general nature of them and a recent 
despatch from London, published in a New York 
newspaper on February 13, confirmed the report of 
the Chinese press. Briefly stated, the most important 
terms of the Agreements relating to the Chino- 
Japanese Military Convention of May, 1918, are as 
follows : 

1. China to recognize Japan's preponderating 
influence in the Orient and call Japan's police 
power to suppress the disorder in the Southern 
Chinese provinces. 

25 



2. China to employ Japanese arsenal direc- 
tors and purchase all arsenal appliances from 
Japan. 

3. China to make no further foreign loans 
without consulting Japan. 

4. China to grant no further railway conces- 
sions to foreigners without consultation with and 
permission of Japan. 

What do these terms amount to? Are they anything 
less than financial and military control of China by 
Japan? If so, is China still an independent nation or 
a Japanese colony ? Or, better, is there any China left 
at all? 

Drastic as the provisions of the Military Con- 
vention are, the notes exchanged on September 24, 
1918, are not next to them in their insidious design. 
The first set of these notes gives the Japanese capi- 
talists the privilege of financing the railways to be 
built first, between Kaiyuan, Hailung, and Kirin; sec- 
ond, between Changchun and Taonan ; and third, from 
a point between Taonan and Jehol to some seaport. 
The total distance of these railways is over 600 miles. 
The plan is, of course, to consolidate and strengthen 
Japan's position in Manchuria and Mongolia, both 
politically and militarily. 

The second set of these notes deals with the ad- 
ministration of Shantung, over which Japan poses as 
an over-lord. According to the disclosed documents, 
Japan is to concentrate her troops at Tsing-tao, with 
a contingent stationed at Tsinan, the capital of Shan- 
tung, and Japanese are "to be employed at the head- 
quarters of the police force, the principal railway sta- 
tions, and the training stations of the police force." 
The concentration of Japanese troops at Tsing-tao, to- 

26 



gether with the employment of Japanese police force 
in Shantung, is for a military purpose, not in Shan- 
tung, bult beyond it. Shantung, Japan thinks, is al- 
ready her own; she now looks farther. This project 
will be seen in a clear light when we examine the 
third set of these secret notes. 

The third set of these notes is a more thorough 
and audacious project of Japan's attempt to conquer 
China. It gives Japan the right to build railways: 
first, from Kaomi, twenty miles west of Tsing-tao, 
running southwest to Suchow, about 250 miles, con- 
necting with the railway from Lanchow, in Kansu 
Province, to the sea; and second, from Tsinan, in 
Shantung Province directly west to Shunteh, a dis- 
tance of about 150 miles. This would connect with 
the railway operating from Peking to Hankow, on the 
Yang-tze River, and connect Tsing-tao with all the 
important railways in North China. With military 
headquarters established at Tsing-tao and with all the 
strategic railways in control, Japan is ready to over- 
run all China, north and south. What a masterful 
scheme ! 

China will surely become a Japanese province if 
these secret agreementts are not made null and void. 
Besides, secret agreements are in direct contradiction 
with the principle of "open covenants." If the League 
of Nations is not to be built on sand, all secret agree- 
ments of whatever kind must meet their proper fate. 

III. The Cancellation of the Boxer Indemnity 

It was in the year 1898 — 20 years from today — on 
account of the murder of two Roman Catholic priests, 
Germany seized Kiao-Chou. In the same year Russia 

27 



pounced upon Port Arthur and Talien-Wan — all these 
the strategic bases of China. Following suit, Great 
Britain took the lease of Wei-hai-wai. 

This rapid spoliation of the Chinese territory 
aroused the patriotism of the Boxers. Ignorant and 
yet daring, they started the anti-foreign movement. 
The Manchu Empress Dowager, who, chafing under 
the iron heels of the powers, was only too glad to find 
an ally for her bigoted vindication of the Chinese 
sovereignty. 

The sad events that occurred in 1900 need no com- 
ment here. Suffice it to say that throughout the tragic 
episode, the uprising was confined to the districts 
around Peking, and that the great majority of the 
Chinese had no part whatever in the fanatic project. 
The most enlightened viceroys, like Yuan Shi Kai and 
L : u Kwan I, refused to obey the secret orders of the 
Empress Dowager to kill all the foreigners, but on the 
contrary gave protection to them. The outbreak itself 
never spread beyond the south of the Yellow River. 

Not only the great majority of the Chinese did 
not have any share in the uprising, but on the con- 
trary they stoutly opposed such suicidal project. 
When the outbreak was in its full swing, they were un- 
able to exert their will, for then the Manchu regime 
was a pure autocracy, over which the Chinese had no 
control. But after the outbreak, especially when they 
had learned the bitter lessons of humiliation, they 
gradually began to realize that the bigoted Manchu 
regime which had instigated the uprising must not 
be allowed any longer to pilot the ship of state, and 
they expressed their conviction in the Revolution of 
191 1, which resulted in the downfall of the Manchu 



Dynasty. In its piace they inaugurated the new re- 
gime of the Chinese Republic, which portended a new 
foreign policy — -"peace on earth and good will toward 
all." 

Such is the background of the case. From this, we 
can see that the Boxer Uprising was not a concerted 
action of the Chinese, but rather the fanatic project of 
the autocratic Manchu rulers and ignorant officials. 
The majority of the Chinese people did not take part 
in the movement. They were its opponents. And yet 
when the trouble was over, the whole country was 
made to pay to the powers an indemnity of $350,000,- 
000 with compound interest to be paid in annual instal- 
ments from 1 90 1 to 1940. The following is the table 
showing the manner in which the indemnity was 
divided to different powers : 

Power Proportion Haiknan Foreign 

(per cent) Taels Currency 

Germany 20,015 67 90*070,515 Mks. 278,166,423.93 

Austria-Hung. ,889 76 4,003,920 Kr. 10,304,092.40 

Belgium 1,885 41 8,484,345 Fr. 31,816,293.75 

Spain 030 07 135,315 Ps. 507,431.25 

United States. 7.319 79 32,939,055 Dol. 24440,778.81 

France 15-750 72 70,878,240 Fr. 265,793,400.00 

Great Britain .11,249 01 50,620,545 £ 7,593,o8o.i9 

Portugal 020 50 92,250 £ 13,837.17 

Italy 5.914 89 26,617,005 lire 99,803,768.75 

Japan 7,731 80 34,793, too Yen 48,950,891.70 

Holland 173 80 782,100 Fi. 1,404,651.60 

Russia 28.971 36 130,371,120 Rou. 180,084,021.44 

Norway &. Sw. .013 06 62,820 £ 9,423-00 

Sundry 033 26 149,870 £ 22,450.10 

This big sum of indemnity has been a tremendous 
burden on the Chinese people. It destroys the eco- 
nomic strength of China. It has been imposed on 
China far beyond the actual damages done to the 
powers, and costs of the expedition. And yet in spite 

29 



of financial stringencies and political disturbances 
existed in China during the last fifteen years, China 
has always met her obligations faithfully. The instal- 
ments were regularly paid whenever they were due. 

That justice should demand the remission of the 
excessive amount of the indemnity none will deny. 
The remission of $10,785,286.12 to China in 1908 by 
the United States is an upright example, and has since 
created an unspeakable good will in China. This good 
will, however, should not he enjoyed by the United 
States alone. 

As soon as China declared war on the Central 
Powers in August, 191 7, the unpaid portions of the 
indemnity due to Germany and Austria-Hungary were 
automatically cancelled. But the outstanding sum due 
to the other powers is still enormous, about $560,- 
000,000 in total. Although the payment has been post- 
poned for five years since China's participation in the 
war, yet mere postponement does not mean that the 
powers have done full justice to China. China wants 
a total cancellation of the outstanding sum, which 
would help her greatly in her internal development. 

China will not feel grateful to the powers, how- 
ever, if they would remit the remaining sum to her 
conditionally, as Japan has tried. Last September, 
Japan proposed to return the indemnity. But her pro- 
posal was strongly refused by China, because of the 
onerous terms attached. These terms were, (1) A 
Japanese adviser should be allowed to be present at 
conferences of Chinese cabinet for considering pro- 
posals to be submitted by the Chinese government at 
the Peace Conference. (2) Prior to the end of the 

30 



European War, China shall not borrow money from 
any other country to return loans contracted from 
Japan and cancel the loan agreements. (3) Japan's 
direction of the use of the indemnity fund and her sub- 
sequent control of the exports of China's iron, cotton, 
and wool products. Any terms like these, backed up 
by sinister motives, China will never welcome. 

Therefore it is the unconditional cancellation that 
China is appealing for. The money belongs to China ; 
she wants free right to dispose the same for whatever 
purpose she likes to. Conditions of any sort would 
impair her sovereign rights. It has been decided, 
however, by the Chinese Government that the indem- 
nity fund, when returned, will be used for her internal 
development, especially along education lines. With 
this decision, the powers are assured that the cancella- 
tion of the indemnity will do greatest good to China. 
Why do not the powers follow the glorious example 
of the United States and remit the unpaid part of the 
indemnity to China? This generosity on the part of 
the powers will surely create good will among the 
Chinese who opposed the Boxer Uprising but have 
been compelled to bear the responsibilitity for the 
penalty therefor. 

IV. The Restoration of Tariff Autonomy 

The existing conventional tariff in China is also 
one of the most serious of the grievances that China 
appeals the Peace Conference for rectification. Broad- 
ly speaking, there are two kinds of tariff — the statutory 
tariff and the conventional tariff. Statutory tariff is 
regulated by the legislation of a state without outside 

31 



interference and is based on the right of taxation en- 
joyed by all sovereign states. Such a tariff is elastic 
and may be utilized for revenue, for the protection of 
infant industries, or for furthering the political and 
economic interests of a state through reciprocal or 
preferential arrangements. A convential tariff, on the 
other hand, is established by treaties with other coun- 
tries. It is inelastic and carried with it none of the 
advantages of the other system. It is this conven- 
tional tariff system which is in force in China at the 
present time. 

The history of China's tariff may be briefly stated. 
It was in the year 1842 when China sustained a crush- 
ing defeat at the hands of the British because of trade 
disputes that China was forced to agree not to levy 
a tariff exceeding five per cent ad valorem on imported 
and exported goods. It is further stipulated in the 
Nanking Treaty of 1842 that the tariff rate is to be 
uniform and not to be changed without the previous 
consent of the High Contracting Parties. Through 
the operation of the so-called "most-favored-nation" 
clause whereby a privilege granted to one nation is 
automatically extended to other nations, this conven- 
tional tariff has come to be applied to goods imported 
from all foreign countries that have treaty relations 
with China. 

The Nanking Treaty of 1842 which compelled 
China to adopt a conventional tariff was somewhat 
modified by the Mackay Treaty concluded between 
Great Britain and China in 1902. In that treaty Great 
Britain agrees that China should have the right to levy 
a surtax of yV 2 per cent on imported goods 
upon the fulfillment of the following conditions: 

32 



(i) if the likin is to be abolished, (2) if all "most- 
favored-nations" should join in the understanding, and 
(3) if their assent were not to depend on "any politi- 
cal concession or any exclusive commercial conces- 
sion." This Mackay Treaty further provides for a 
complete revision of the tariff at the end of ten years. 
In 191 2 the question of revision was brought up but 
nothing was accomplished. In August, 191 7, after 
China had declared war on Germany, the Allied pow- 
ers were pursuaded to agree to the raising of the 
tariff to an effective 5 per cent. This was absolutely 
necessary in view of the fact that the tariff then 
existing was fixed in 1902, and that since 1902 the 
price of commodities has been considerably increased. 
Such is a brief history of the conventional tariff 
in China. Our next step is to inquire into the main 
features of the system. In the first place the con- 
ventional tariff provides for a uniform rate of five 
per cent on imported and exported goods. It does 
not distinguish raw materials from manufactured 
goods nor luxuries from necessities. Consequently 
it fails to do justice to the poor people who have to 
depend for their existence upon the necessities and 
it affords no protection for infant industries which 
are just developing in the country. This arrange- 
ment is very unfortunate, for an import duty is but 
a tax on consumption and as such should be* justly 
distributed. To levy an uniform tax on both neces- 
sities and luxuries is to impose an undue burden on 
the laboring class. Hence, it violates the first prin- 
ciple of taxation and is working directly against the 
well-established' practice of the modern advanced 
countries. Experience in other countries has also 

33 



demonstrated that infant industries such as those de- 
veloping in China must need protection in order to 
secure for them a normal growth and development. 
This is not necessarily a selfish policy, as to foster 
home industries is but one of the most effective means 
of increasing the per capita wealth of the country 
and consequently the purchasing power of the nation 
for foreign goods and commodities. Therefore, even 
from the point of view of their own commercial in- 
terest, the treaty powers should agree to the complete 
removal of the tariff restrictions on China. 

The second great defect of the conventional tariff 
in China is that it provides for only a five per cent 
tariff, which is entirely too low for revenue purposes. 
This is self-evident when we compare the custom 
receipts of the various countries. In the United States 
the revenue of the Federal government before the 
Civil War consisted chiefly of custom receipts. Even 
in the fiscal year 1913-1914 just before the outbreak 
of the world war the custom receipts yielded some 
39 per cent of the total Federal income. In Ger- 
many customs and excises also contributed in 191 3 
about 45 per cent of the total ordinary revenue. In 
France in 19 14 customs yielded some 20 per cent of 
the total revenue including both direct taxes and direct 
contributions. Even Great Britain, a free-trade coun- 
try, depends upon its tariff for revenue. The duties 
on imports alone amounted in 19 14 to over 22 per cent 
of the total revenue. On the other hand, China 
realized in 1914 only about 9 per cent of her total 
revenue from customs. It is true that in that year 
the total revenue of the state was $351,064,812, while 
the custom revenue amounted to HK Tls 18, 202,741 

34 



were derived from import duties. In China, unlike in 
other countries, the maritime customs include not 
only import duties but also export duties, coast trade 
duties, tonnage dues, transit dues and opium likin. 
This in part explains why China has to borrow, even 
under onerous terms, for reorganization and other 
purposes. This in part is also responsible for the 
political intrigue carried on in the various foreign 
loans that threaten to destroy the fiscal independence 
of the Republic of China. It is clear therefore that 
if justice is not to be denied to China and if China 
is to be given a fair chance to work out her own 
salvation, she must have her tariff autonomy restored. 
This is beneficial not only to the Chinese nation as a 
whole but also to all the treaty powers concerned, as 
a stable government based on sound finance will enable 
the Chinese people to improve their communication 
facilities, to develop their natural resources and there- 
by to increase the volume of international trade and 
commerce. The fact that likin has been a great 
obstacle to both internal and external trade and that 
its abolition must necessarily be accompanied by in- 
creasing the tariff rate as a compensation, makes it 
even more necessary that these crippling tariff 
restrictions on China should be abolished. 

The history of the conventional tariff having been 
briefly stated and its main features discussed, it re- 
mains for us to emphasize once more the grave 
injustice done to China by the treaty powers. It 
can not be too often nor too strongly stated that if this 
tariff remains in force, China will be permanently 
crippled both in respect to her internal development 
and her foreign trade. Growing industries must be 

35 



impeded. Revenues will be insufficient. Foreign 
loans must be contracted. The people who are obliged 
to pay high duties on necessities will have their already 
heavy burdens unduely increased. And the foreign 
trade can not be sufficiently developed either to bal- 
ance or to counteract these evils. 

Not alone is this conventional tariff detrimental 
to the best interest of the Chinese Republic but it is 
also harmful to the various powers concerned. It 
must be clear to every thoughtful person that a China, 
unabled to develop her resources and consequently 
having next to no foreign trade, can contribute very 
little to the development of the world, and that thus 
the treaty powers, by persisting in their atti- 
tude, are indirectly injuring themselves. Therefore, 
not only justice but also the self-interest of the treaty 
powers demands that China should have restored to 
her the tariff autonomy to which every free nation is 
justly entitled. 

V. The Relinquishment of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction 

The origin of extraterritoriality in China can be 
traced as far back as the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries when a want of regard for Chinese laws 
characterized the foreigners who went to China for 
the sole purpose of replenishing their purses. Great 
Britain, especially, resisted the exercise of China's 
jurisdiction over her subjects in criminal cases. Finally 
a bill passed the House of Commons in 1833 which 
provided for the establishment of a British court in 
China and this was duly executed later in the year. 
The Treaty of Nanking between China and Great 

36 



Britain in 1842 did not expressly provide for the en- 
joyment of a privilege of extraterritoriality by British 
subjects; but at the same time there were substantial 
grounds for believing that such a concession was 
granted by the Chinese authority as part of the price 
paid for the restoration of peace and friendship. The 
grounds for so believing are that the General Regula- 
tions signed between China and Great Britain referred 
to a certain correspondence exchanged at Nanking in 
1842 which conceded to Britain the principles of 
extraterritoriality, that such a concession by China was 
expressly stated by the Marquis of Lansdowne in the 
House of Lords some three months after the treaty 
of Nanking arrived at London, and that the General 
Regulations were considered and understood at the 
time as forming a part of the treaty of peace. China's 
formal recognition of alien extraterritoriality was 
embodied in the Treaty of Peking, signed in i860, 
after the war between China and the allied forces of 
Great Britain and France. Since that year, subse- 
quent treaties with America, Sweden, Denmark, and 
almost all the other countries with whom China had 
conventions gave this extraterritorial jurisdiction to 
foreigners residing in China. In 1876 the treaty of 
Chef 00 was entered between China and Great Britain 
as the result of the murder of an Englishman in 
Yun-Nan, a southern province, by the uncivilized 
mountain tribes there. One of the important features 
of this treaty is the recognition by China of the alien 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in her territory. Foreign 
and mixed courts are now established in the alien set- 
tlements and leased territories to try cases in which 
aliens are involved. 

37 



To understand this problem we shall first examine 
the rules governing the exercise of such rights of 
extraterritoriality. If a case concerns the aliens of one 
and the same nationality, then all questions in re- 
gard to rights, whether of property or of person, shall 
be subject to the jurisdiction of their own authorities. 
But if the dispute affects the subjects of different 
nationalities, then it shall be regulated by the treaties 
existing between the various states, "without inter- 
ference on the part of China." In respect to mixed 
suits or actions between Chinese and foreigners, the 
treaties provide that in civil suits Chinese and aliens 
shall state their grievances at the alien consulate and 
in case the consul cannot settle them amicably, then 
he shall request the assistance of the Chinese authori- 
ties ; and, in criminal cases, Chinese criminals shall be 
tried and punished by Chinese authorities, according 
to Chinese law, while alien criminals shall be tried by 
their consuls and punished according to their own 
national law. There is another novel system existing 
in Shanghai both in the International and French Set- 
tlements. It is the so-called Mixed Court. A mixed 
court is a Chinese tribunal which decides all suits and 
actions between Chinese who are resident within the 
settlements, as well as between Chinese and foreign 
residents in cases where Chinese are defendants. 

The extent of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China 
covered all questions in regard to rights of property 
and of person. In practice, the jurisdiction over the 
person of aliens in China is very far-reaching and un- 
limited. For instance, wherever a subject of a for- 
eign power may go within the Chinese dominions he 
brings with him his right of exemption from the ter- 

38 



ritorial jurisdiction and when he commits an offence 
he shall be handed over to the nearest consul of his 
nation for punishment. By right of extraterritoriality, 
a foreigner in China is immune from search by 
Chinese authorities in his house or vessel within the 
treaty ports. Under the aegis of extraterritoriality 
there has grown up in some twenty-five open ports a 
practice for some of the grantees to establish their 
own post offices therein. After the Boxer troubles of 
1 900, to prevent a recrudescence of the anti-foreign 
outrages, international garrisons are stationed between 
Tientsin and Peking and the Legation Quarter in 
Peking maintains its own legation guards. All these 
practices impair China's territorial integrity and na- 
tional independence and were imposed upon China 
against her will. 

Deficiencies of the extraterritorial jurisdiction are 
numerous and they constitute strong reasons for its 
relinquishment. A Chinese may enter a suit against a 
foreigner in the latter's national court, or vice versa, 
but the latter is entitled to no relief if he counter- 
claims against the plaintiff. This disability may entail 
hardships and inconveniences, but it is a necessary 
result of the immunity from process in the local courts. 
It is the price for which they must pay for this im- 
munity. Therefore extraterritoriality is not at all 
absolutely advantageous to the aliens who enjoy it. 

Uncertainty of punishment in the system causes 
much complaint among the Chinese against this sys- 
tem. Difficulties in the way of languages, differences 
in court procedure, the disparity of punishments in 
the two systems and the complexities of Western law 
prevent a Chinese from having his redress against an 

39 



alien in the latter's consular court. Then there is the 
practice in most consular courts for the prisoners 
charged with grave offences to be sent home for final 
trial and punishment. In such cases the sequel is 
generally unknown to the Chinese directly interested 
and the belief becomes inevitable that such criminals 
have escaped unpunished. This practice, therefore, 
both damages the good name of the foreign country 
and robs the Chinese of the satisfaction of knowing 
that due punishment has been inflicted on the guilty. 
Moreover, alien offenders of law are more leniently 
treated by his consular court than a Chinese by his 
own national court. But Chinese involved in law 
suits in the mixed court are treated very harshly. 
For instance, an accidental homicide is excusable in 
Western law, but in Chinese law the accused is never- 
theless made to compensate the family of the deceased. 
Over this point cases of disputes between China and 
the Western powers are repeatedly found in the his- 
tory of Chinese diplomacy. On the other hand, crimi- 
nal carelessness may not be punishable unless it 
results in an injur) 7 to the person of another, as an in- 
jury involving damage to property is civilly action- 
able ; but in the Shanghai foreign settlements, Chinese 
are convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the 
mixed courts for carelessness resulting in damage to 
the property of aliens. 

Besides these legal objections to the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in China, the system is very obstructive 
to foreign trade in China. Owing to the almost un- 
limited rights of extraterritoriality, China cannot 
throw her doors wide open to all aliens to trade in 
all parts of China. Owing to the demarcated areas 

40 



within the open ports and the separate municipal ad- 
ministrations in those areas, Chinese look upon aliens 
with suspicion and unfriendly feelings. If interna- 
tional trade in China is to thrive and not to be hinder- 
ed by artificial barriers, early relinquishment of all the 
extraterritorial rights by all treaty states with China 
must be promised. When China is open to the resi- 
dence of all aliens and all restrictions as to passports, 
demarcated areas, etc., are disposed with, a new era of 
prosperity of Far Eastern Trade will inaugurate. 

In present day China, any fear of possible renewal 
of anti-foreign movement has no more ground for 
existence because the conservative Manchu dynasty 
has been replaced since 191 1 by the progressive re- 
publican government. Moreover, China has long 
awakened to her international obligations. Her inter- 
national status has been definitely settled. She has 
participated in the Hague, Geneva, and other universal 
conventions. She has also taken part in such minor 
international gatherings as legislated for the white 
slave traffic, protection of birds, bills of exchange, 
prison reform, hygiene and sanitation, and the like. 
She was formally recognized as a member of the 
family of nations soon after her revolution eight years 
ago. And, lastly, but most significantly, China dili- 
gently engaged herself in the recent world struggle 
against German autocracy, in checking the eastward 
advance of the Bolsheviki movement in Siberia, in 
forming the peace treaty of 1919 at Paris, and in 
drafting the Constitution of the League of Nations. 
Therefore she is universally recognized to-day an 
independent sovereignty, and as such she must be 
treated accordingly. Nothing in international law 

41 



hinders a nation from existing as an independent state 
more than the practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
and therefore its abolition must be immediately ac- 
ceded. 

It is indeed true that China has defects in her 
judicial system. But she has shown great progress 
toward the legal reform during the last few years. In 
1904 a code of commercial law T , following the prin- 
ciples of that of England, was adopted. A Bureau of 
Law Reform was established in Peking in 1908 to take 
up the work of recodification of Chinese Laws. This 
was succeeded by Law Codification Commission, ap- 
pointed in 1914. This commission, with a group of 
foreign advisers, has been studying all law systems of 
the world. Efforts have been made to codify Chinese 
laws in accordance with the spirit of European and 
American laws. Already a draft of new criminal 
code was published in Chinese last September, which 
was subsequently translated with English and French. 
A new Civil Code is in the process of revising now. 
It has been the hope of the commission that within 
five years the revision of Chinese Laws will be com- 
pleted and promulgated. Thus China's claim of relin- 
quishment by extraterritoriality, gradually if not im- 
mediately, is not altogether unjustifiable. 

As to the stationing of international garrison and 
legation guards in China, no more necessity is found 
today. Anyone who is in any way familiar with re- 
cent affairs in China can recall that every time there 
is any disturbance in any part of China, the Chinese 
authorities, whether north or south, immediately pro- 
ceed to protect the aliens' person and property. In 
no case has this duty been neglected. China has been 

42 



known as one of the most trustworthy nations in ad- 
hering to her treaty obligations. She should be given 
a free hand to guard foreign legations in Peking and 
the international guards should be called back .at once, 
because her troops and police are capable enough now 
to look after the safety of foreigners in China. 

Regarding foreign postal system in 'China, there 
is no more need of its further existence either. Since 
March I, 1914, China is admitted as a member of the 
International Postal Union. The act of admitting a 
new member presupposes a recognition of the effi- 
ciency of its system on the part of the co-signatories 
of the union. Therefore there is no valid reason for 
the continuous existence of these twenty-five foreign 
post offices in different parts of China. 

From the above facts, it is clear to the world that 
the relinquishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
China is not a problem of non-importance. Already, 
in 1902, the Chino-British Commercial Treaty of 
Shanghai expressed Britain's willingness to relinquish 
her extraterritoriality in China in these words : "China 
having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial 
system and to bring it into accord with that of Western 
Nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance 
to such reform, and she will also be prepared to re- 
linquish her extraterritorial rights when she is satis- 
fied that the state of Chinese laws, the arrangement 
for their administration, and other considerations war- 
rant her in so doing." The United States and Japan 
followed the example of Great Britain in 1903 and 
Sweden in 1908 in promising to relinquish their extra- 
territorial rights when they shall find China's laws 
satisfactory to them. This consent might have been 

43 



perfect if it had been coupled with either a probation- 
ary time-limit clause or an honor clause, or both. To 
say that within a definite period of, say, five years 
if China shall satisfactorily reform her judiciary in 
harmony with the Western systems, all extraterritorial 
rights therein will be withdrawn or surrendered, would 
povide a strong incentive to a people who are doing 
their utmost to put their house in order. China thus 
waits for a fair and just decision from the Conference. 

VI. The Retrocession of Leased Territories 

To treat in great detail the causes and events of the 
Opium War of 1842 and the Arrow War of i860 will 
be too long a story. Suffice it to say that these wars 
were the first ones that led China to open her ports 
to foreign trade, and they marked a new era in the 
history of Chinese diplomacy. Before the former 
date, it is true, there were foreigners in China. But 
their status was of an undefined nature. In 1842 the 
Treaty of Nanking was entered between China and 
Britain and five ports were thrown open to inter- 
national trade, namely, Canton, Foochow, Amoy, 
Ningpo and Shanghai. Besides, China for the first 
time in her recent history ceded to Great Britain by this 
treaty the island of Hong-Kong. The treaty of Pe- 
king of i860 which concluded the Arrow War between 
China on the one hand and the allied forces of Great 
Britain and France on the other, ceded to Great 
Britain a portion of the township of Kowloon, which 
is a peninsula standing in a strategic position over- 
looking Hong-Kong. For a long lime Great Britain 
coveted this territory and before the signing of the 
Treaty of Peking she had already secured a lease of 

44 



the same in perpetuity. Eleven more ports were opened 
in 1861. They were: Newchwang, Tenchow, Taiwang, 
Tsaochow, Hainan, Tansui, Nanking, Chenkiang, 
Kiukiang Hankow and Tientsin. Fifteen years later, 
in the treaty of Chefoo, entered into between China 
and Great Britain, five more ports — Yeeehang, Wuhu, 
Wen-Chow, Peihai of Kwangtung Province and 
Tsung-Chin of Szechuan Province — were opened to 
foreign trade. 

The "scramble" for territorial leases and rail- 
way and mining concessions of 1898 marked the 
climax of foreign aggression in China. For a petty 
grievance of the murder of two German mission- 
aries in Shangtung province, China was made to 
lease to Germany under duress Kiao-Chou for a 
period of ninety-nine years. Germany also forced 
China to cede to her railway and mining rights in 
the province of Shantung. Although the leased 
territory was meant to be enjoyed by the lessee 
for peaceful engagements, Germany made use of it 
as a naval station. Russia, one of the two imperialistic 
countries in the Far East, forced China to lease to 
her Liaotung Peninsula for a period of twenty-five 
years. In 1905, this lease was transferred to Japan 
by Russia as one of the terms of the Treaty of 
Portsmouth which concluded the Russo-Japanese 
War, in spite of the fact that such leases were 
explicitly made non-transferable. The Treaty of 
May 25, 1915, between China and Japan extended 
the lease to ninety-nine years. In the same year, 
1898, France obtained a lease from China of Kwang 
Chow- Wan for ninety-nine years and Great Britain 
obtained from China a lease of Weihaiwei "for so 

45 



long a period as Port Arthur (the lease of 
Liaotung Peninsula, including the famous port, Port 
Arthur) shall remain in the occupation of Russia." 
In their essential features, these leases resemble one 
another; and for the duration of the tenancy the 
territorial sovereign's administrative rights are 
suspended, unless expressly reserved, and in their 
place those of the lessee states substituted. 

The places agreed upon for international trade 
and residence are of four different kinds: (i) A 
concession, or piece of territory conveyed by deed 
of grant in perpetuity to a lessee state for the 
residence of its nationals, the same to be admin- 
istered by it, "saving the sovereign righ l:s of the 
Emperor of China." (2) A settlement, or site 
selected for the residence of all foreigners, within 
which they may organize themselves into munic- 
ipality for certain purposes and be governed by 
their elected representatives. (3) A voluntary set- 
tlement, or one in a port spontaneously opened by 
China itself for the residence of aliens, of which 
the control of municipal administration and police 
remain vested in the local authorities. (4) A set- 
tlement by sufferance, or one within which the resi- 
dents have acquired, without any formal agreement 
on the part of the territorial sovereign, the tacit 
right to govern themselves as a municipality. 

It is clear that all these leased territories and settle- 
ments were wrung from China unwillingly. More- 
over, the object of the powers in occupying the^e 
strategic ports was for purposes of keeping "balance 
of power" one with another. This phrase, however, 
has only a historical value to-day and is no longer 

46 



applicable to the Far Eastern situation. The lease of 
Kiao-Chou like that of Port Arthur, was illegally trans- 
ferred to Japan in 191 5. Such transference may be 
diplomatic, but they are illegal insofar as China is 
concerned with the lessee and cannot let any other 
power to take over the leased rights. The prin- 
ciple of the League of Nations as proposed by 
President Wilson is to do away with the balance of 
power among the strong nations in the weaker and 
less developed countries. The allied powers can 
do no better good to China than to return these 
leased territories to China so as to do full justice 
to the League of Nations. All jealousy and 
suspicion among the Western nations and Japan in 
their interests in China will be done away with if 
the first principle of open diplomacy is to be en- 
forced. Besides, China is never going to alienate any 
part of her territory to any foreign power here- 
after, as her Peace Delegates openly proclaimed in 
Paris recently, and China will be thrown wide open 
to all foreign trade and residence without any fur- 
ther need of the sphere of influence of any power 
in any part of China. In the treaties of these leases, 
almost invariably there were the so-called non- 
alienation clause regarding to railway and mining 
rights China ceded to the lessees. 

Today, the sole power that is dominating the Far 
Eastern Affairs is Japan, who holds both the leases of 
Port Arthur and of Kiao-Chou, which formerly be- 
longed to Russia and Germany respectively. China 
will neither stand for a further extention of balance of 
power, which will be contradictory both to the 
principles of the Open Door policy as proclaimed 

47 



by Secretary John Hay of the United States in 1898 
right after the "scramble" for concessions, and 
to the principles of the League of Nations; 
nor will China stand for the most unwel- 
comed Japanese domination in China. The political 
philosophy of an international democracy is a 
product of the twentieth century and the allied 
powers are its creators. If such a democratic 
political philosophy is to prevail and to lead to per- 
petual peace among nations, neither balance of 
power nor Japanese domination in China should be 
tolerated by all the nations in the world. Circum- 
stances which had called the leased territories into 
existence have now all fundamentally altered. New 
circumstances have now come into existence which 
call very urgently for the restoration of the leased 
territories to China. The United States, being 
China's special friend and the originator of the Open 
Door policy in China, ought to finish the game by abso- 
lutely mowing out seeds of imperialism and autocracy 
in the Far East as well as in Europe, and advocate the 
restoration of all the leased territories and settlements 
in China. 

VII. The Abolition of Financial Imperialism 

Financial Imperialism is the financial control of 
one nation over another through politics. It is firstly 
to control a nation financially, then to strangle it and 
finally to place it under alien receivership. As applied 
to China the control is deliberately planned. It has 
a malicious purpose. Every nation has her own in- 

48 



terest to serve. Hence there was "battle of conces- 
sions" and there was general scramble at the expense 
of China. 

The most objectionable fact is the system which 
sanctions what is known as the right of preference. 
It consists of two main species. The first is the 
polito-commercial zone system styled "Spheres of 
Influence" signifying that a particular piece of terri- 
tory shall not be alienated to any third state with- 
out the consent of the other contracting party. The 
second provides that one contracting state shall 
have the right to be offered the first option to accept 
or refuse a certain contemplated transaction. Let 
us consider the first. Elaborate historical treatment 
is unnecessary. Suffice it to say that a little after 
the Chino-Japanese war the battle of concessions 
was started. In 1897 France wanted China to de- 
clare for herself that she would never alienate or 
cede the Island of Hainan to any foreign power 
"either as a final or temporary cession or as a naval 
station or a coaling depot." In 1898 Great Britain 
suggested and China agreed that she shall never 
alienate the provinces adjourning Yangtze River 
either as lease mortgage or any other designation. 
In order to make her position doubly secure Great 
Britain had tipped off the once terrible Polar Bear 
by the understanding reached between th*e two 
powers declaring that "first Great Britain engages 
not to seek for her own account or on behalf of Brit- 
ish subjects or others any railroad concessions to 
the north of the Great Wall of China and not to ob- 
struct directly or indirectly applications for railroad 
concessions in that region supported by Russian 

49 



government, and secondly Russia on her part en- 
gages' not to seek for her own account or on behalf 
of Russian subjects or others any railroad conces- 
sions in the basin of the Yangtze and not to obstruct 
directly or indirectly applications for railroad con- 
cessions in that region supported by the British 
government." In 1898, due to the demand of Japan, 
China declared non-alienation of the province of 
Fukien "with all the territory in the interior and 
along the sea coast within its limits." In 1915 
China declared to the same power that within the 
province of Shantung or along its coast no terri- 
tory or island shall be leased or ceded to any for- 
eign power under any pretext. In the same year 
she further assured the same power that she has 
given no permission to foreign nations to construct 
on the coast of Fukien province dockyards, coaling 
stations for military purposes, naval bases, or to set 
up other military establishments. 

The legal phase of the sphere of influence need 
not be discussed, for, aside from the formal con- 
ventions which might seemingly give it legal sanc- 
tity, international law does not justify its exist- 
ence. The law of nations allows the excluding of 
other powers in a given territory by a given power 
only when that territory is contiguous to her do- 
minions or protectorates or strategic locations that 
may be used to the disadvantage to the said power 
by an enemy. China is neither a dominion of nor 
a protectorate under any power, hence no spheres 
of influence can be recognized. 

It is, however, the economic side that endangers 
China most. These so-called "spheres" are really 
politico-commercial zone systems. They influence 

So 



the exchange of commodities as well as the import 
of capital. The power that has the predominating 
influence can always create artificial conditions in 
favor of her own commodities. These artificial con- 
ditions may take the form of reduced taxes, rebates 
in transportation or in half a dozen other ways. As 
far as commodities are concerned, however, there 
may not be sufficient ground for over apprehension, 
for after all competition may not be entirely done 
away with. We can manage to adapt ourselves to 
new conditions and struggle for the markets. But 
when we consider the import of capital we face a 
different problem. As is deducible from the 
Anglo-Russian agreement, the necessary result 
from this zone system will be as is intended to be 
the exodus of available capital from other sources. 
No nation will take the chance of stepping into 
somebody's threshold if she is not ready to go to 
the limit, which in the last analysis may mean war. 
Economically speaking then, the sphere of influ- 
ence is really no less than a political guarantee of 
a monopoly for economic exploitation by the coun- 
try that has the predominating influence. The ex- 
clusive character can not be over-emphasized, for 
it is the one factor that gives to those spheres their 
unique distinction as well as notoriety. Such is 
financial imperialism pure and simple. It -is the 
alliance of power with wealth, the combination of 
flag and capital that has played such havoc with 
the peaceful Republic. 

The second of the system of rights of prefer- 
ence is the right of the first option to accept or 
refuse a certain contemplated transaction. It ap- 
plies to loans as well as railroad and other con- 

5i 



cessions. Art. XVII of the Reorganization Loan 
of 10J3 for 25,000,000 pounds sterling, for example, 
reads as follows : "In the event of the Chinese 
Government desiring to issue further loans secured 
upon the revenues of the salt administration, or 
to issue supplementary loans for the purposes of 
the nature of those specified in Art. II of this agree- 
ment, the Chinese Government will give to the 
banks the option of taking such loans . . . The 
Chinese Government undertakes further that for 
a period of six months after the complete issue of 
this present loan and the payment of the last in- 
stalment thereof in terms of the prospectus, it will 
not proceed to the issue of any other government 
loan or loan having a government guarantee con- 
cluded later than April 10th, 1913, without previous 
agreement of the banks." The right of first op- 
tion is even more clearly brought out in the loan 
of 191 1 for industrial development and currency re- 
form. Art. XVI of the agreement reads "If the 
Imperial Chinese Government should desire to 
obtain, from other than Chinese sources, funds in 
addition to the proceeds derived from the loan to 
continue or complete the operations contemplated 
under this agreement the Imperial Chinese Gov- 
ernment shall first invite the banks to undertake a 
loan to provide the funds required; but should the 
Imperial Chinese Government fail to agree with 
the banks as to the terms of such supplementary 
loan, then other financial groups may be invited to 
undertake the same and should the Imperial Chinese 
Government decide to invite foreign capitalists to 
participate with Chinese interests in Manchurian 

52 



business contemplated under this loan, or to be 
undertaken in connection therewith the banks shall 
first be invited to participate." 

The same can be said of railroad loans except 
the stipulation goes even further. In essence it 
provides that the creditor having advanced the 
money for the construction of a railroad in a given 
piece of territory, all funds for the construction 
of subsequent lines within the territory will like- 
wise be provided by the same creditor unless he 
should decline the option. It is only plain that 
these terms are onerous to a degree that is unbear- 
able and give a political hue to purely financial 
transactions. It is financial imperialism, it is again 
political maneuvering for economic exploitation. 
The debtor nation may want to borrow else- 
where or may even likely secure better terms, 
but under the agreement she must approach the 
same creditor nation again for accommodations un- 
less the latter chooses to decline. This creates a 
virtual monopoly in favor of generally foreign 
capitalist and particularly capitalists of the con- 
tracting party. With the politico-commercial zone 
systems installed here and there and almost every- 
where, the question is whether China is allowed to 
stand on her own feet. Is she to be helped by the 
family of nations or is it their deliberate attempt 
to prove that the history of Egypt can, and, with de- 
termination will be made to repeat itself in China 
irrespective of consequences? 

The scramble for the privileges for railroad 
construction is described by Lord Salisbury as the 
"battle of concessions. " As in everything else, it 
is essentially politico-commercial. The very nature 

53 



of it can be easily imagined by the claim of a cer- 
tain well known minister at Peking, who said, "I 
repeat what I said to you when here, not a bona 
fide or approximately practical scheme which has 
been brought to this legation has failed to be put 
through." One can readily see what kind of terms 
are generally imposed upon China when the diplo- 
mats flock into Peking with a group of shrewd con- 
cessionaires. There are two kinds of railroad con- 
cessions: (i) Concessions to foreign governments, 
and (2) concessions to individuals or to companies 
backed up by their respective governments. The 
first group of concessions to foreign governments 
was demanded for political purposes. France has 
extended the Tonking line into Yunnanfu. Russia 
has extended her Trans-Siberian into Manchuria. 
Great Britain has resorted to similar measures. But 
the policy of Japan in South Manchuria affords 
an illuminating example of the working of the 
''Spheres of Influence," of the doctrine of the first 
option and of "Spheres of Interests," especially in 
connection with railroads. After the Russo-Jap- 
anese War, Japan gained the vantage ground of 
Liao-tung Peninsula and the control of the South 
Manchuria railroad through the instrumentality of 
which she virtually dominates Manchuria. In the 
Portsmouth treaty and in her subsequent treaties 
with China, Japan has pledged to observe the 
"Open Door" policy and to preserve the integrity 
of China. But no sooner than the war had been 
concluded before Japan started to carry out her 
imperialistic program. At the point of bayonet 
she forced China to allow her to build the new 

54 



Antung-Mukden railroad. She furnished half of 
the capital for the construction of the Hsinmingtun 
Mukden and Kirin Changchun lines. In obtaining 
these concessions she took care to make it under- 
stood that, if the lines were to be extended, appli- 
cation for assistance should be first made to her. 
This stipulation did not seem to be as formidable 
as it really was, it was nothing short of a monopoly. 

For instance, in 1907 China made a contract 
with a British firm to build the railroad from 
Hsinmingtun to Fakumen in Manchuria. Objec- 
tion was made by Japan on the ground that this 
line would parallel part of the Japanese South Man- 
churian railroad and she produced in support of 
her position a secret clause of the Yuan-Komura 
agreement in 1905 made between China and Japan 
concerning Manchuria. China denied that she had 
accepted that agreement; but Japan induced England 
to refuse support to the British firm, and China was 
compelled to abandon the project. 

Again, in 1909, a project was developed by 
American, British and Chinese interests for the 
construction of a Chinese government line from 
Chinchow to Aigun. The plan was approved by 
the Chinese government and had the support of the 
American government. It is generally understood 
that the British government at first favored the 
project until Japan and Russia finally signified 
their disapproval. They absolutely vetoed the 
scheme on the ground that it would be a menace 
to their economic interests in Manchuria. The 
rights and interests of China received no consider- 

55 



ation; and the Chinese government and American 
capital were forbidden to construct a railroad on the 
Chinese soil. 

While the negotiations for the building of the 
Chinchow-Aigun railroad were in progress, Mr. 
Knox, then Secretary of State of the United States, 
advanced a proposal, saying "the most effective 
way to preserve the undisturbed enjoyment by 
China of all political rights in Manchuria and to 
promote the development of the open door and 
equal opportunity would be to bring the Man- 
churian highways, the railroads, under an economic, 
scientific, and impartial administration by some 
plan vesting in China the ownership of the railroads 
through funds furnished for that purpose by the 
interested powers willing to participate." The Brit- 
ish and the German governments were in sympa- 
thy with the general principles of the scheme; but 
the Japanese government promptly announced her 
disapproval. As a result the whole project was set 
to nought. Whatever the merits of Mr. Knox's 
proposal, it clearly brought out the fact that Japan 
was determined to keep other nations out of Man- 
churia and that China's autonomy was seriously 
compromised. 

Turning now to loans we will find the same in- 
tention to control China financially through diplomacy. 
The various loans are too numerous to enumerate. 
They represent also an enormous sum. The an- 
nual interest charges are already a financial strain 
to a nation that is yet young in industrial develop- 
ment. The Boxer Indemnities add to the drain on her 
economic sources. The effect of both these charges 
is to so reduce the revenue of the government that 

56 



most of the reform measures can not be carried into 
conclusion. It is bad enough to be a debtor nation, 
worse yet is it to be one that has to accept whatever 
usurious and onerous terms the creditor nations may 
seek to impose. 

Of loans there are two kinds. One is the public 
loan and the other is the loan for specific purposes, 
as for instance the construction of railroads. The 
latter have been sufficiently treated under railroad con- 
cessions, hence they need not be repeated any further. 
The Public loans are loans directly to the govern- 
ment for general purposes, for instance, the re- 
organization in 19 1 3 after the Revolution. Loans 
require securities of one sort or another, and in 
China various sources of revenue where the gov- 
ernment derives its chief support are pledged as 
securities. In the course of the last score of years, 
man}'' taxes, as the custom duties, the likin charges, 
as well as other taxes, were already pledged as 
securities. Should there ever occur a default of 
payment the taxes are to be transferred and admin- 
istered by the custom authorities. Accordingly, 
China appears to be an enormous piece of mortgage. 
Other provisions are equally exacting and are of 
a monopolistic nature. The points discussed under 
previous topics apply here as well. In 1913, for 
example, failing to agree with the banking syndi- 
cate at Peking, China succeeded in securing credits 
in the London market. But the attempt was dis- 
credited by the syndicate. It merely strengthened 
the latter's cohesive power. The Six power group 
subsequently formed with the backing of their re- 
spective governments worked for the monopoly of 

57 



loaning money to China. The ulterior motives of 
some powers became evident during the process of 
negotiations. The American group withdrew after 
President Wilson's declaration that the United 
States would not be a party to any attempt to ham- 
per the young Republic financially or politically. 

There is no need for describing any further. 
The "Spheres of Influence/' the right of first option, 
railroad concessions and loans point unmistakably 
to the existence of financial imperialism or of a policy 
of financial control through diplomacy. That jus- 
tice demands the discontinuance of financial imperi- 
alism under all circumstances none will deny. That 
even expediency demands the inauguration of a 
new era can be easily explained. The world has 
reached a state of cosmopolitan consciousness, and 
its chief concern in future, as is at present, will be 
the maintenance of peace. Financial imperialism 
as practised in China is exclusive of each other's 
interests. It is competitive and conflicting. And 
where there is conflicting interest there is germ for 
rupture which may eventually lead to war. The 
world is tired of war. Will it tolerate factors that 
cause war? 



58 



SUMMARY 

The above peace claims of China do not suggest 
any unreasonable outburst of patriotic passion, but 
rather indicate briefly the wrongs that China has 
suffered in the past. Since China began her rela- 
tions with foreign nations, nearly a century ago, 
she has been outraged one way or another by dif- 
ferent powers at different times. Her international 
prestige and national honor have been broken down 
to pieces. Her territorial integrity has been no 
more true in actual conditions, though still in diplo- 
matic phraseology. Her political independence has 
been reduced to nothing but a mere fiction. In the 
late years, Japan even tries to get control of her 
finance and army. Thus China has nearly lost her 
right of existence as a sovereign and independent 
nation. Yet China has always showed good will 
toward all, and given no provocation to any. Is 
it just to strangle a nation of such a brilliant past 
and of such a promising future? Is it right to en- 
danger the destiny of 400,000,000 industrious and 
peace-loving people? 

Surely the Peace Conference will answer these 
questions negatively. The spirit of the glorious 
victory of the war indicates the birth of a universal 
feeling that imperialism of any description must be 
totally condemned and cast away as a dead theory 
of the by-gone generation ; the goal of the proposed 
League of Nations, embodied in President Wilson's 
lofty ideals and enlightened principles, promises 
to mankind an upright new regime of nationalism 
and internationalism, based on right and justice. 
With this spirit and toward that goal, not only 
China has the ample justification to claim for an 

59 



international adjustment that would give her an 
honorable place among the family of nations, but 
also the Paris Conference has an important duty to 
work out such a readjustment so as to make China 
an efficient and effective member of the League, and 
unroot all the causes of the future wars now fer- 
menting in the Far East. Such a readjustment will 
not only mean the safety of China's place under the 
sun, but ultimately also the permanent peace of the 
world. 

China is a sovereign and independent nation. 
She wants to exist as such. Her territorial integ- 
rity must be maintained. Kiao-Chou, including the 
port of Tsing-tao, must be unconditionally returned. 
Japanese domination in China in general and in 
Shantung and Manchuria in particular must be ter- 
minated. China must have complete sovereignty 
over her territory. "Spheres of Influence" must be 
abolished. All the territories that have been leased 
to different powers against China's will, like Port 
Arthur, Talien-Wan, Kwang-Chou-Wan and Wei- 
Hai-Wei, should be one and all restored to China. 
No more "Balance of Powers" should be tolerated. 
Mongolia, Manchuria and Tibet are integral parts 
of China's territory. No attempt at either luring 
them away from China or exercising special influ- 
ence over them should be permitted. 

China wants her political independence respect- 
fully observed. The notorious Twenty-One De- 
mands and the malicious treaties that Japan forced 
China to accept must be made null and void. The 
entity of China's jurisdiction must be restored. Ex- 
traterritoriality now existing in China should be 
relinquished gradually, if not immediately. For- 

60 



eign garrisons stationed at various places of China 
should be recalled. Foreign post offices in China 
should be closed. China must have absolute free- 
dom in her financial affairs. The conventional tariff 
now in force in China should be removed. Politi- 
cal stipulations should not be allowed in contract- 
ing any loan between China and other powers, for 
whatever purposes. Boxer Indemnity which was 
exacted from China far beyond the actual injuries 
done to foreign powers should be cancelled. China's 
army and navy represent China's sovereignty. No 
nation should be allowed to get control of them. 

These major claims of China aim at nothing but 
the restoration of her complete sovereignty and 
independence which she is morally and legally 
entitled to. Unless the Far Eastern status is radi- 
cally revised by the enlightened powers now gather- 
ing at Paris, the League of Nations will be only a 
dream. Unless "Spheres of Influence" and "Bal- 
ance of Powers" are done away with, the permanent 
peace of the world will not be in sight. Unless all 
the wrongs done to China in the past are one and 
all righted, the happiness of mankind would never 
be realized. 

In reply to the question asked by the Peking 
correspondent of The New York Times, Why did 
China endorse the League? Premier Chien Neng- 
Hsun said, "There are two considerations. First 
China believes in the establishment of justice and 
right throughout the world, and, second, China her- 
self feels that she may expect the world to apply 
these principles to her own problems." In an inter- 
view with the some correspondent, President Hsu 
Shih-Chang said, "If unfortunately the League of 

61 



Nations fails to become a fact, the result will not 
only be that the world's aspiration will remain 
unrealized, but that the Far East may become the 
first region dangerously affected." These words of 
Premier Chien and President Hsu voice the senti- 
ment of all China. China endorses the League with 
full expectation and faith, will the other members 
of the League do full justice to her? 



62 



Address all communications to 

Mr. K. P. Wang 
(Secretary of the Committee) 

5 to West 113th St. 
New York City 



63 



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